Provably fair random picking
Most random pickers ask you to take their word for it. This page explains what we do instead, in the order it happens, and what each step would and would not stop. The normative version is the algorithm specification; this is the readable one.
The three steps, in order
- Commit: your browser hashes the list, the weights and a random salt, and the server stores that hash before anything else happens. The list is now fixed, but still secret.
- Draw: the server asks PureRand for fresh random values. Each request is recorded in a public chain with a timestamp, so the randomness has an existence independent of us.
- Record: the commitment, the randomness, its source and the result go on a receipt at a permanent URL, which verifies in the reader's own browser.
Where the randomness comes from
Every draw asks PureRand for fresh random values. The receipt records which source produced them, so you never have to take our word for it.
PureRandom A is a quantum source: the values come from a physical process measured by the provider, not from a formula. When the receipt says quantum, that is what api2 reported for those samples.
CSPRNG fallback is the classical alternative. If a quantum source is out of reach or inside its rate limit at that moment, PureRand uses the operating system's cryptographic random generator instead of waiting. That is still unpredictable randomness; it is simply not measured from a physical process.
A single draw can use both. The receipt lists each source with the number of samples it produced, for example thirteen of sixteen from the quantum source and three from the fallback. Nothing is rounded up, and a draw the service did not break down is shown as exactly that.
This matters because a claim you cannot check is only a claim. The mix is recorded per draw, on the same receipt as the result.
What this does and does not prove
It proves that the list was fixed before the randomness arrived, and that the randomness came from a chain whose history we do not write. It does not prove that the list contained everyone it should have: if a name was never entered, no amount of cryptography will notice. That is why the publish option exists for draws where entrants need to see themselves on the list. Being clear about the boundary is part of the claim.
What the receipt proves
Every draw is committed before it happens and recorded afterwards. The receipt holds the commitment, the randomness, its source and the result, and anyone with the link can check that they fit together.